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Introduction 
Robert Foley, like many Americans, needs a new hip.1 However, un-
like most Americans, he is a convicted murderer and currently sits on 
Kentucky’s Death Row.2 Mr. Foley was convicted of six murders 
 
† J.D., 2014, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; B.A., Purdue 
University. Sincere thanks to Professor Michael Benza, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law, for inspiring my interest in the legal 
issues surrounding prison healthcare. I am grateful to Professor Sharona 
Hoffman, Christina Petersen Greer, Sean Lee, and the Health Matrix 
Volume 24 staff for their support and hard work. 
1. More than 285,000 hip replacements are performed every year in the 
United States. Total Hip Replacement, AM. ACAD. OF ORTHOPEDIC 
SURGEONS (Dec. 2011), http://orthoinfo.aaos.org/topic.cfm?topic=a00377. 
2. Death Row Inmates, KY. DEP’T OF CORR., 
http://corrections.ky.gov/communityinfo/pages/deathrowinmates.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2014). 
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committed over a three-year period in Kentucky and is one the most 
prolific murderers in the state.3  
Mr. Foley was under death warrant, meaning he had exhausted his 
appeals and the Kentucky Supreme Court had affirmed his execution.4 
All that remained was for the Kentucky Governor to set the execution 
date.5 Then the Department of Corrections acknowledged Mr. Foley’s 
need for a new hip.6 Finding a facility willing to take on the heightened 
security standards that come with treating a death row inmate and 
locating a doctor to perform the procedure on a condemned man had 
proved to be an uphill battle.7 Negative public opinion and possible 
political ramifications had affected the Kentucky Department of Correc-
tions’ actions. The Department of Corrections had to balance the 
constitutional requirement to provide care to inmates with the preserva-
tion of correctional system time, money, and resources on an individual 
whom the state might eventually kill.8 In fact, the warden wrote that he 
would “contact [the medical director] to try to stop all medical proce-
dures related to [Foley’s] hip replacement” once an execution date was 
set.9 While a non-institutionalized citizen may have to pay a significant 
amount of money out-of-pocket for such a procedure,10 taxpayers’ money 
is funneled through the state’s Department of Corrections to fund 
inmate health care.  
Mr. Foley’s saga is not the only one to spark debate about costly 
and extraordinary care for death row inmates. David Long was convicted 
and sentenced to death for killing three women with a hatchet in their 
Texas home.11 Mr. Long overdosed on drugs the night before his sched-
 
3. Brett Barrouquere, Ky. Weighed Politics, Medicine in Inmate’s Surgery, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 17, 2012), http://bigstory.ap.org/content/ky-
weighed-politics-medicine-inmates-surgery.  
4. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.218 (West 2013).  
5. Barrouquere, supra note 3. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id.  
9. Id. 
10. Even Medicare patients can be liable for thousands of dollars’ worth of out-
of-pocket expenses for surgeries. Lesley Alderman, Knee and Hip 
Replacements: What You Need to Know, CNN MONEY (Aug. 5, 2011), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/05/pf/joint_replacement.moneymag/index
.htm.  
11. Press Release, Tex. Office of the Att’y Gen., David Martin Long Scheduled 
to Be Executed (Dec. 7, 1999), available at 
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/newspubs/newsarchive/1999/19991
207longadvsy.htm. 
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uled execution.12 When he was found unresponsive in his cell, prison 
officials rushed him to the hospital where he was placed in the Intensive 
Care Unit (ICU).13 The doctor recommended Mr. Long remain in the 
ICU for two more days but ultimately released him prior to his sched-
uled execution time on the condition that medical personnel transport 
him from the hospital to keep his condition stable.14 The State of Texas 
took heroic measures to revive him immediately before his execution 
date, so the state could kill him on its own schedule. 
Federal and state prison populations have exploded since 1980. In 
1980 the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had approximately 25,000 
inmates in its custody.15 By 2012 the inmate population had increased to 
almost 219,000 inmates.16 Between 1980 and 2012 the average annual 
increase of inmates in the federal prison system was approximately 6,100 
inmates per year. The state prison population has also risen dramatical-
ly. Approximately 500,000 inmates were housed in state prisons in 
1985.17 By 2011 the total population of state inmates had risen to almost 
1.4 million inmates.18  
Prison inmates are sicker than the non-institutionalized population 
and require more frequent care as a result.19 Incarcerated individuals, 
whether in federal prison, state prison, or jails, are more likely than their 
non-institutionalized counterparts to have diabetes, hypertension, 
asthma, prior myocardial infraction (commonly known as a heart 
attack), and HIV/AIDS.20 The drastic rise in the prison population 
coupled with the prison population’s collective poor health causes a great 
strain on correctional department budgets. 
Death row, reserved for those sentenced to death for the most hei-
nous crimes, has also seen a population increase. In 2012, there were 
 
12. Jim Yardley, Texan Who Took Overdose Is Executed, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 
1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/09/us/texan-who-took-overdose-
is-executed.html. 
13. Id. 
14. Id.  
15. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON 
POPULATION BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES AND OPTIONS 2 
(2013). 
16. Id. 
17. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1997, at iii (2000), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus97.pdf. 
18. E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2011, at 6 (2012), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf. 
19. See Andrew P. Wilper et al., The Health and Health Care of US Prisoners: 
Results of a Nationwide Survey, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 666, 669 (2009). 
20. Id. 
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3,146 death row prisoners21 in thirty-five states across the United States, 
including death row inmates held by the United States government and 
the United States military.22 The death row population has exceeded 
3,000 inmates per year since 1995,23 and the average amount of time a 
death row inmate spends between sentencing and execution has been 
steadily increasing.24 Currently, the average time between sentencing and 
execution is 178 months.25  
The length of time between sentencing and execution has contribut-
ed to the rise in the average age of the death row population. In 2005 
137 death row inmates were 60 years of age or older, compared to just 
39 inmates in the same age group in 1995.26 As inmates age, they become 
a bigger financial burden on the prison system, due to higher rates of 
illness and injury.27 Prisons spend more money on death row inmate 
health care than on health care for the general inmate population 
because of compounding needs for more health care and greater security 
costs associated with treating death row inmates outside of the correc-
tional facility. 
The tension between an inmate’s constitutional guarantee to receive 
health care, the public opinion that inmates should receive less care, and 
limited funds and resources makes it difficult for corrections officials to 
determine the proper course of action. On one hand, the prison system 
 
21. Size of Death Row by Year (1968-Present), DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-
row-year#year (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Size of Death Row]. 
As of 2002, a total of 6,152 individuals had been sentenced to death since 
1973, of which 899 had been executed. John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: 
“Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV. 939, 1008 
(2004). 
22. Size of Death Row, supra note 21. New Mexico, Connecticut, and 
Maryland have abolished the death penalty, in 2009, 2012, and 2013 
respectively, but the law was not made retroactive. As a result a total of 
eighteen inmates remain on death row between the three states. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Time on Death Row: Introduction, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.. 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row (last visited Mar. 21, 
2014). 
25. U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2010 – STATISTICAL TABLES 
12 (2011), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp10st.pdf. 
26. Time on Death Row: Aging Death Row Population, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/time-death-row#aging (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2014). 
27. See generally Anthony A. Sterns et al., The Growing Wave of Older 
Prisoners: A National Survey of Older Prisoner Health, Mental Health and 
Programming, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug. 2008, at 70 (noting that longer 
sentences have increased the population of elderly inmates in need of costly 
medical care). 
Health Matrix·Volume 24·2014  
“Death Is Different”: Limiting Health Care for Death Row Inmates 
321 
must provide a minimum level of health care to inmates, but on the 
other hand, prison officials must effectively utilize their prisons’ health 
care budgets.28 In a survey of forty states, the total amount spent on 
prison health care in those states exceeded $335 million in 2011, and 
many of the states exceeded their prescribed budget.29  
Case law and professional standards have established “the minimum 
standards to be followed – the floor below which service cannot legally 
fall – but not the upper limits on what the state is obligated to pro-
vide.”30 This Note will answer the question: Is the prison system required 
to provide death row inmates with expensive procedures after the 
inmates exhaust all appeals? The short answer to the question is no. 
Part I provides the historical context of the prison’s duty to provide 
medical care to inmates under the Eighth Amendment. Part II argues 
that prisons are already able to limit inmate care in various ways. Part 
III recommends that death row inmates’ care should be restricted to 
emergency and life-sustaining care after inmates have exhausted all 
appeals. Part IV will argue that limiting health care to death row 
inmates after all appeals have been exhausted would withstand Eighth 
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny. Part V will address 
potential criticisms of the proposed regulation.  
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRISON HEALTH CARE 
STANDARD 
The Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment31 is 
not a modern concept. The ban was originally implemented in the 
English Declaration of Rights of 1689 as an attempt to curb the govern-
ment’s use of torture and barbaric physical punishment.32 This ban was 
 
28. In California, the cost of health care per inmate per year is approximately 
$11,600 while Texas spends $2,920 per inmate per year for approximately 
the same inmate population size. Jasmine L. Kiai & John D. Stobo, Prison 
Health Care in California, UC HEALTH (Jan. 22, 2010), 
http://health.universityofcalifornia.edu/2010/01/22/prison-health-care-in-
california. 
29. CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. FOR JUSTICE, THE 
PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 6 (2012), 
available at 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/price-of-
prisons-updated-version-021914.pdf. 
30. Douglas C. McDonald, Medical Care in Prisons, in CRIME AND JUSTICE 
427, 462 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999). 
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
32. Michael Cameron Friedman, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the 
Provision of Prison Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference 
Standard, 45 VAND. L. REV. 921, 925 (1992). 
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subsequently adopted in the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Until the twentieth century, the Eighth Amendment was 
narrowly interpreted as only a prohibition against torture and barbaric 
punishments.33 However, the Eighth Amendment standard for defining 
cruel and unusual punishment is dynamic and changes as society 
matures and evolves. The Constitution does not expressly require 
medical care for inmates. The 1976 Supreme Court case Estelle v. 
Gamble extended protection under the Eighth Amendment to include 
the state’s affirmative duty of the state to provide proper medical care.34 
In the Estelle decision, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
embodies “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, 
humanity, and decency”35 and the “evolving standards of decency . . . 
mark the progress of a maturing society.”36 The Court used these 
principles to establish the government’s obligation to provide medical 
care to inmates since incarceration removes an inmate’s ability to 
procure medical care on his own.37 Further, the court held that denial of 
all medical care could result in pain and suffering that serves no 
penological purpose.38 The Court formulated a two-prong test to deter-
mine if a state actor has violated the Eighth Amendment rights of a 
prisoner seeking medical care: the state actor must be deliberately 
indifferent and the medical need must be serious enough for a violation 
to exist.39 
A. Deliberate Indifference Prong 
The Supreme Court further defined what constitutes “deliberate in-
difference” in Farmer v. Brennan.40 The Court ruled that deliberate 
indifference requires a more culpable mental state than negligence.41 The 
Court also held that deliberate indifference could occur even in the 
absence of intent to cause harm or knowledge that harm would result.42 
The determination of a constitutional violation turns on whether the 
official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 
safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the 
 
33. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)). 
36. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
37. Id. at 103. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 104. 
40. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
Health Matrix·Volume 24·2014  
“Death Is Different”: Limiting Health Care for Death Row Inmates 
323 
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 
and he must also draw that inference.”43  
B. Serious Medical Need Prong 
For an inmate to qualify for protection under the Eighth Amend-
ment, the health issue must be serious. The definition of “serious medical 
need” is much more difficult to pinpoint and has been defined on a case-
by-case basis.44 If a physician determines that the condition is serious 
enough to warrant treatment and recommends a treatment, the condi-
tion is considered a serious medical need.45 A serious medical need exists 
if a layperson could recognize the need for medical attention.46 Many 
courts have found conditions to be serious if they cause pain, but pain is 
inherently subjective.47 A condition that significantly affects the inmate’s 
daily activities48 or could cause a life-long handicap49 can also constitute 
a serious medical need. However, medical needs can range from “a need 
for an immediate intervention to save the patient’s life to the desire for 
medical treatment of trivial discomforts and cosmetic imperfections that 
most people ignore.”50 Therefore, it is difficult to determine a bright-line 
rule as to what constitutes a serious medical need. In Ralston v. McGov-
ern the Seventh Circuit suggested that defining a serious medical need is 
difficult and “is a function both of objective need and of cost. The lower 
 
43. Id. at 837. 
44. Courts have found no serious medical need in a variety of cases. See, e.g., 
Dye v. Lomen, 40 F. App’x 993 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that back pain and 
a cut were not a serious medical need); Rodriguez v. Mercado, No. 00 CIV. 
8588 JSRFM, 2002 WL 1997885 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2002) (stating 
that bruises did not justify serious medical need). But see Green v. 
Mazzone, No. 99–3190(JEI), 2002 WL 1636709 at *5 (D.N.J. July 19, 2002) 
(stating that severe arthritis is a serious medical need); Davis v. Carter, 
452 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2006) (deciding withdrawal from methadone 
constitutes serious medical need). 
45. Monmouth Cnt.y Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (quoting Pace v. Fauver, 479 F. Supp. 456, 458 (D. N.J. 1979), 
aff’d 649 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1981)). 
46. Id. 
47. See East v. Lemons, 768 F.2d 1000, 1001 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding arm 
cramps during physical work were a serious medical need). 
48. See Scott v. Garcia, 370 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1057 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (holding 
severe gastrointestinal condition interfered with ability to eat and thus 
qualified as a serious medical need). 
49. See, e.g., Layman ex rel. Layman v. Alexander, 343 F. Supp. 2d 493 (W.D. 
N.C. 2004) (holding serious medical need evident when arrestee hit his 
head, fell unconscious, and suffered brain damage as a result of lack of 
medical attention). 
50. Ralston v. McGovern, 167 F.3d 1160, 1161 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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the cost, the less need has to be shown, but the need must still be shown 
to be substantial.”51 
Health care is a constitutional right for inmates as a result of the 
Estelle decisions.52 The United States does not afford a constitutional 
guarantee to medical care for any other class of individuals. The idea 
that inmates are afforded more care than some law-abiding citizens 
draws criticism from the non-institutionalized public.53 These criticisms 
worsen if the inmate is on death row.54 However, the prison system is 
reluctant to execute an ill inmate.55 As one law professor stated, “‘Dead 
man walking is one thing’ . . . ‘[d]ead man being pushed along to the 
execution chamber in a wheelchair’ has a different feel.”56 
C. Strain of Health Care Costs on the Prison System 
In 1970 7.2% of the United States’ gross domestic product (GDP) 
was devoted to health care.57 By 2010 that figure had risen to 17.9% of 
the GDP.58 The cost of health care for prison systems has risen at almost 
the same rate as the cost of health care nationwide.59 In prisons, older 
inmates and expanding inmate populations have caused a rise in the cost 
of health care.60 Older inmates can cost as much as nine times more than 
their younger counterparts.61 Further, prison administrators are hesitant 
 
51. Id. 
52. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
53. Texans Deserve Relief from Prison Health Care Costs, STATESMAN (Oct. 
4, 2012, 1:01PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/opinion/texans-
deserve-relief-from-prison-health-care-cost/nSTKc/ (discussing negative 
opinions on inmate health care policy due to high economic costs). See also 
NORMA B. GLUCKSTERN ET AL., NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE EXECUTIVE 
TRAINING PROGRAM, HEALTH CARE IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS: 
MANUAL 1 (1979). 
54. Karen Brandon, Furor over Transplants for Death Row Inmates, CHI. 
TRIBUNE (Mar. 1, 1996), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-03-
01/news/9603010235_1_liver-transplant-organ-transplant-mitchell-rupe. 
55. Id. See also Yardley, supra note 12. 
56. Richard Willing, Death Row Population Is Graying, USA TODAY (Feb. 10, 
2005), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-02-09-elder-
death_x.htm. 
57. KAISER FAM. FOUND., HEALTH CARE COSTS, A PRIMER: KEY INFORMATION 
ON HEALTH CARE COSTS AND THEIR IMPACT 4 (2012), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7670-03.pdf. 
58. Id. 
59. Jessica Wright, Medically Necessary Organ Transplants for Prisoners: 
Who Is Responsible for Payment?, 39 B.C.L. REV. 1251, 1253 (1998). 
60. Timothy Williams, Number of Older Inmates Grows, Stressing Prisons, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012, at A19. 
61. Id. 
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to allocate scarce funding to the prison health care budget, in part due 
to taxpayer frustration that state governments spend tax dollars on 
criminals while cutting funding to public schools or state infrastructure.62 
Courts have generally held that cost cannot be a factor in determin-
ing what constitutes satisfactory health care.63 The concern is that 
inmates in poorer states would not be afforded the same constitutional 
right to health care as their counterparts in wealthier states.64 As stated 
in Hamm v. Dekalb County, the “state’s interest in limiting the costs of 
detention . . . will justify neither the complete denial of . . .[food, living 
space, or medical care] nor the provision of these necessities below some 
minimally adequate level.”65 However, in Bowring v. Godwin, the Fourth 
Circuit explicitly stated that the right to a specific treatment is “limited 
to that which may be provided upon a reasonable cost and time basis 
and the essential test is one of medical necessity and not simply that 
which may be considered merely desirable.”66  
II. Prisons’ Ability to Limit Inmates’ Medical Deci-
sions 
The prison system has significant control over an inmate’s medical 
decisions. Inmates do not have an absolute right to refuse treatment, nor 
do inmates have the ability to choose a doctor, facility, or course of 
treatment. The BOP limits the scope of treatment provided to an 
inmate when the inmate is less than twelve months from release. Since 
the prison system can limit care in these ways, it should be able to limit 
health care to a death row inmate once he has exhausted all appeals.  
A. Limitations on a Prisoner’s Right to Refuse Treatment 
Inmates generally have the choice to refuse medically necessary 
treatment.67 The Supreme Court found in Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health that an inmate’s ability to decline care is 
a constitutional right68 under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
 
62. Wright, supra note 59. 
63. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1509 (11th Cir. 1991). 
64. Id. 
65. Marc J. Posner, The Estelle Medical Professional Judgment Standard: The 
Right of Those in State Custody to Receive High-Cost Medical Treatment, 
28 AM. J.L. & MED. 347, 353 (1992) (quoting Hamm v. Dekalb County, 774 
F.2d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
66. Bowring v. Godwin 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added). 
67. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (stating 
“that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest 
in refusing unwanted medical treatment”). 
68. Id. at 279. 
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Amendment.69 An inmate can decline life-saving treatment if he so 
chooses,70 but the prison system may override the inmate’s constitutional 
right to refuse medical care if the state’s interest outweighs the inmate’s 
liberty interest in his refusal.  
A prison system has the authority to balance various state interests 
with the inmate’s liberty interest in his right to refuse medical treat-
ment.71 State interests include: “(1) the preservation of life; (2) the 
protection of interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of 
suicide; and (4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession.”72 In Polk v. Iowa, the Supreme Court of Iowa found that an 
inmate’s right to refuse care was secondary to the state’s interest in 
preserving life.73 Brown (the inmate in Polk) refused dialysis, and the 
court reasoned that his condition was not terminal and continuing 
treatment against his will carried no “heavy physical and emotional 
burden” for Brown.74 The Supreme Court of Iowa held the prison system 
could force Brown to participate in dialysis against his will even though 
he was of sound mind and judgment to make the medical decision on his 
own.75 
B. No Choice of Facility or Doctor 
Unlike their non-institutionalized counterparts, inmates do not have 
the ability to choose their doctor, facility, or treatment method.76 
Inmates also do not have the ability to obtain a second opinion if they 
desire one.77 Most inmates are treated through the sick call procedure in 
their correctional facility, whereby an inmate requests to see a medical 
professional at the correctional facility. In the BOP system, physicians’ 
 
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating “. . . nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .”). 
70. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261 (holding the wishes of the guardians to end 
life-saving care of the patient in a vegetative state requires clear and 
convincing evidence that the unconscious patient would agree to such 
care); Stouffer v. Reid, 993 A.2d 104, 106 (Md. 2010) (holding that an 
inmate has a right to refuse kidney dialysis even though his refusal would 
result in serious injury or death). 
71. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279. 
72. Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 634 (Mass. 1986). 
73. Polk Cnty. Sheriff v. Iowa Dist. Ct. of Polk Cnty., 594 N.W.2d 421, 427 
(Iowa 1999). 
74. Id. (quoting Comm’r of Corr. v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Mass. 1979)). 
75. Id. at 431. 
76. Posner, supra note 65, at 361 n. 101 (“In essence, Estelle holds that a 
prisoner is constitutionally entitled to the treatment prescribed by a 
medical professional. This right would not seem to encompass second 
opinions or choice of doctors or treatments.”). 
77. Id. 
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assistants and nurse practitioners usually provide primary care to 
inmates.78 The staff physicians oversee the physicians’ assistants and 
nurse practitioners.79 Staff physicians also determine whether the 
assistants’ and nurse practitioners’ recommendations fall within the BOP 
services and policies.80 Staff physicians then bring recommendations 
before utilization review committees for approval of procedures or 
referrals to other professionals outside of the sick call system in the 
prison.81  
The prison system contracts with hospitals or specialists for treat-
ments and procedures beyond the level of care provided at the 
correctional facility.82 As a result, inmates are not allowed to choose 
which doctor treats them or in which hospital they receive treatment.83 
The procedures for finding a doctor, facility, or specialist for inmates can 
be difficult depending on the availability of the particular medical 
professional or facility within the community where the prison is located, 
the willingness of providers to travel to the corrections facility and 
subject themselves to security measures if the provider opts to treat the 
inmate in the prison, and the willingness of doctors or hospitals to see 
inmates at their facility.84 
Robert Foley understands the difficulties associated with acquiring 
treatment outside of the prison in his effort to get his hip replaced.85 The 
prison approved Mr. Foley to receive the hip replacement; however, the 
state could not find a doctor or facility willing to operate on a death row 
inmate under death warrant.86 The practical availability of doctors and 
facilities is limited by proximity to the prison: the further prison person-
nel must transport a prisoner, the greater the financial and 
administrative burden on the prison.87 Hospitals and medical providers 
 
78. Alan Ellis, BOP Health Care: What You (and Your Clients) Need to 
Know, 23 CRIM. JUST. 45, 48 (2009). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 47. 
82. Id. at 48. 
83. PUBLIC WORKS, UNDERSTANDING GEORGIA’S CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS OF 
HEALTHCARE 8, available at 
http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/pdf/ReportCorrectionalHealthCareSystem.pdf 
(last accessed Mar. 22, 2014) (“This is especially true in a prison 
environment where inmates may not choose their own health care provider, 
may not select their own insurance plan, do not have access to over-the-
counter medications and cannot take a ‘day off for sick time,’ at will.”). 
84. Ellis, supra note 78, at 48. 
85. See supra Introduction. 
86. Barrouquere, supra note 3.  
87. Id.  
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have balked at performing Mr. Foley’s procedure because he is a death 
row inmate, which requires additional security measures to keep all 
parties involved safe.88  
C. Denial of Care Based on Date of Release 
The BOP limits care based on the amount of time left on an in-
mate’s sentence by attempting to define medically necessary treatments. 
If an inmate has less than twelve months of his sentence remaining, the 
prison will provide medical services only for conditions that fall under 
the “Medically Necessary – Acute or Emergent” or “Medically Necessary 
– Nonemergent” categories.89 “Medically Necessary – Acute or Emer-
gent” is defined as “[m]edical conditions that are of an immediate, acute 
or emergent nature, which without care would cause rapid deterioration 
of the inmate’s health, significant irreversible loss of function, or may be 
life-threatening. Conditions in this category warrant immediate treat-
ment that is essential to sustain life or function.”90 These conditions 
include stroke, heart attack, sudden loss of vision, and severe bleeding.91 
“Medically Necessary – Nonemergent” care includes:  
[m]edical conditions that are not immediately life-threatening but 
that without care the inmate could not be maintained without sig-
nificant risk of serious deterioration leading to premature death, 
significant reduction of the possibility of repair later without pre-
sent treatment; or significant pain or discomfort that impairs the 
inmate’s participation in activities of daily living.92  
“Medically Necessary – Nonemergent” cases include care of chronic 
diseases such as diabetes, cancer, and heart disease, as well as treatment 
of infectious diseases like HIV and tuberculosis.  
Within twelve months of a release date, an inmate is no longer eligi-
ble for a medical procedure that would provide limited long-term gain, 
including procedures for minor conditions.93 The BOP also limits an 
inmate’s access to elective procedures such as reconstruction of the 
anterior cruciate ligament in the knee or joint replacements.94 The BOP 
defines these procedures as “Medically Acceptable – Not Always Neces-
 
88. Id.  
89. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISON’S EFFORTS TO 
MANAGE INMATE HEALTH CARE 6-7 (2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/BOP/a0808/final.pdf. 
90. Id. at 6. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Ellis, supra note 78, at 46. 
94. Id. 
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sary”95 because their main purpose is to improve the inmate’s quality of 
life.96 Any procedure falling under this category must be approved by a 
Utilization Review Committee that can weigh the benefits of treatment, 
available resources, and the effect the procedure (or lack thereof) will 
have on the inmate’s every day life.97  
The BOP includes organ transplants for prisoners only if the prison-
er meets specific criteria.98 To date, no death row inmate has received an 
organ transplant, although an Oregon death row inmate requested one.99 
The concern is that organ transplants affect the life of the individual 
donating the organ, if the donor is alive, as well as other possible organ 
transplant recipients by allowing an incarcerated individual to take 
precedence over a non-incarcerated individual. Exceptions can be made 
to this general policy; however, when a general population inmate falls 
within twelve months of release, he is not allowed this course of treat-
ment.100 Inmates are still able to receive dialysis or other non-transplant 
treatments.  
No court has directly criticized limiting care based on the inmate’s 
release date. However, there are some cases that provide insight. Some 
jurisdictions have held that an inmate must show the potential of harm 
to have an Eighth Amendment claim under the Estelle standard.101 In 
Boring v. Kozakiewicz the Third Circuit held that if a medical condition 
can be treated after a prisoner is released without harm from such a 
delay, the state would not be required to commence treatment.102 
However, courts have split on whether it is the state’s responsibility to 
provide a time-sensitive procedure for an inmate, such as an abortion. 
The Sixth Circuit held that although a female inmate had a right to an 
 
95. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE., supra note 89, at 6-7. 
96. Id. at 6. 
97. Id. at 7. 
98. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Patient Care, Policy No. 
6031.03, at 40-41 (Aug. 23, 2012), available at 
http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/6031_003.pdf. 
99. See Bryan Robinson, Death-Row Inmate Seeks Organ Transplant, 
ABCNEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90611&page=1 (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2014). 
100. Ellis, supra note 78, at 46 (stating that organ transplants fall under the 
category of “Extraordinary” treatment and are not available for inmates 
within a year of their release date). 
101. Posner, supra note 65, at 359-60. 
102. See Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that 
if a pretrial detainee has a condition that can be treated after release, it is 
not the prison’s responsibility to provide care). Pretrial detainees are 
afforded a reasonable standard of care under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which is the same level of care afforded to an 
inmate under the Eighth Amendment. Id. 
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abortion, the prison was not obligated to provide the procedure under 
the Estelle standard because the abortion was not medically necessary.103 
However, the Third Circuit held that failure to allow a female inmate 
access to an abortion puts undue burden on her and amounted to a 
violation of the Estelle standard, regardless of the elective nature of the 
procedure.104  
III. Recommendation for Limiting Care to Death Row 
Inmate 
Prison health care systems are restrained by the budgets afforded to 
them by their state. In fact, ten to twenty percent of a prison system’s 
budget is used for inmate health care.105 It is imperative that the money 
allotted to the prison health care system be used efficiently. Compared 
to non-institutionalized Americans of the same age, incarcerated individ-
uals are more likely to have diabetes, hypertension, persistent kidney 
problems, cirrhosis, hepatitis, and HIV/AIDS.106 For example, hyperten-
sion treatment costs relatively little107 but benefits the largest percentage 
of inmates at the federal and state level.108 It is important that the 
prison system effectively treat broad groups of inmates with easily 
treatable or avoidable illnesses without being burdened by exorbitantly 
high costs for surgeries and procedures for inmates who will be executed. 
An upper limit must be placed on prison health care. 
The responsibility of limiting care lies with the state and the prison 
system. The treating physicians cannot be responsible for limiting care 
due to the nature of the physician-patient relationship.109 Neither is the 
 
103. Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 536 (6th Cir. 1991). 
104. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 348 (3d 
Cir. 1987). 
105. State Strategies for Controlling Inmate Health Care Costs, NAT’L 
GOVERNORS ASS’N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES (Aug. 1, 2012), 
http://www.nga.org/cms/home/nga-center-for-best-practices/meeting--
webcast-materials/page-hsps-meetings-webcasts/col2-content/main-
content-list/state-strategies-for-controlling.html. 
106. Wilper et al., supra note 19, at 669. 
107. Peggy Peck, Popular Blood Pressure Medicine May Do More Harm than 
Good, WEBMD (Aug. 29, 2000), http://www.webmd.com/hypertension-
high-blood-pressure/news/20000829/popular-blood-pressure-medicine-may-
do-more-harm-than-good. The cost of hypertension treatment can range 
from $60 per year for a diuretic in 2000 to $990 per year for name-brand 
drugs in 2000. Although these figures do not account for inflation, it is still 
a relatively inexpensive ailment to treat. Id. 
108. Wilper et al., supra note 19, at 669. 
109. See generally Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Nancy S. Jecker, Should a 
Criminal Receive a Heart Transplant? Medical Justice vs. Societal Justice, 
17 THEORETICAL MED. 33, 34 (1996). 
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judicial branch in the position to determine prison procedures adequate-
ly. All courts have consistently given significant deference to prison 
policies and practices and are “reluctant to interfere with a prison’s 
internal discipline.”110 Further, the “courts are ill equipped to deal with 
the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform.”111 
Nevertheless, the courts will intervene in prison policies to protect the 
prisoners’ constitutional rights.112 
The policy rationale behind providing care is significantly different 
for death row inmates and the general inmate population. Procedures 
and treatment are given to general population inmates on the theory 
that they will, at some point, rejoin society. Treating short-term inmates 
in prison saves society the burden of paying the costs for treating the 
inmate later. Further, treating infectious diseases is imperative in prison 
due to the high transmission rate within the prison113 and the chance 
that once released, the inmate could transmit diseases to the rest of the 
community.114 However, death row inmates will never rejoin society, 
especially after the appeals process has concluded, so the prison system 
does not need to worry that they may infect the community or become a 
burden to the non-institutionalized health care or welfare systems. 
It “shocks the conscience” that death row inmates may be eligible 
for organ transplants—another very costly procedure.115 At least two 
cases where death row inmates attempted to receive organ transplants 
have been widely publicized, one of which prompted the state legislature 
to attempt to ban such procedures.116 Organ transplants make economic 
sense for inmates who will live out their natural lives in prison because 
the date of their death is a relative unknown;117 however, the long-term 
benefit is not the same for death row inmates who have a more definitive 
date of death. Not only will the death row inmate not be able to use the 
organ as long as another individual, but transplantable organs are a 
scarce medical resource. Over 117,000 individuals are awaiting organ 
 
110. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1968). 
111. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974). 
112. Friedman, supra note 32, at 928. 
113. Joseph A. Bick, Infection Control in Jails and Prisons, 45 CLINICAL 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1047, 1047 (2007). 
114. See Tom Puleo & Lisa Chedekel, Dollars and Lives: The Cost of Prison 
Health Care, NEW ENG. CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING, (Mar. 26, 
2011), http://necir-bu.org/investigations/taxpayer-watch-series/dollars-
and-lives-the-cost-of-prison-health-care-2/. 
115. See Robinson, supra 99; Brandon, supra note 54. 
116. Robinson, supra 99; Brandon, supra note 54. 
117. Robinson, supra 99 (reporting that an Oregon death row inmate costs a 
reported $121,000 per year to remain on dialysis, while the surgery could 
cost between $80,000 and $120,000 and eliminate the need for dialysis). 
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transplants, and 74,000 of those patients are on the active waiting list, 
which means they are medically eligible to receive a transplant.118 
However, only slightly more than 28,000 transplants were performed in 
2012.119 Approximately eighteen individuals die each day in the United 
States because of a lack of transplant organs.120 
Replacements and transplants can be incredibly costly. A hip re-
placement for an inmate can cost over $50,000, and a knee replacement 
over $40,000 just for the initial procedure and hospitalization.121 These 
estimates do not factor in the costs of transportation or security for the 
inmate. Transplants are also very expensive procedures. Cornea replace-
ment is the most prevalent transplant in the United States and has the 
lowest total cost of any transplant at around $20,000, including the 
thirty-day pre-transplant period, organ procurement, hospital admission 
for the transplant, the cost of the physician to perform the transplant, 
the 180-day post-operative admission to the hospital, and prescrip-
tions.122 Kidney transplants, the second most transplanted organ, have a 
total cost of over $250,000.123 Other transplant procedures can total more 
than one million dollars.124 None of these figures factor in the additional 
costs associated with treating death row inmates, such as transportation 
from the correctional facility to the health care facility and the cost of 
security while the inmate is away from the correctional facility.  
To help restrain costs and conserve scarce medical and prison re-
sources, death row inmate care should be limited and mirror the BOP 
standards for time limitations and definitions for medically necessary 
treatments.125 Once a death row inmate has completely exhausted the  
118. Glossary, ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANT NETWORK, HEALTH RES. 
AND SERVS. ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/glossary.asp 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2014). 
119. Statistics, DONATE LIFE AMERICA, http://donatelife.net/understanding-
donation/statistics/ (last visited April 19, 2014). 
120. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ORGAN DONATION AND 
TRANSPLANTATION FACT SHEET 1 (2010), available at 
https://www.womenshealth.gov/publications/our-publications/fact-
sheet/organ-donation.pdf. 
121. Barrouquere, supra note 3; INTEGRATED HEALTHCARE ASS’N, ORTHOPEDICS 
DATA COMPENDIUM: USE, COST, AND STRUCTURE FOR TOTAL JOINT 
REPLACEMENT 23 (2006), available at 
http://www.iha.org/pdfs_documents/medical_device/07_OrthopedicsDat
aCompendium.pdf. 
122. MILLIMAN, INC., 2011 U.S. ORGAN AND TISSUE TRANSPLANT COST 
ESTIMATES AND DISCUSSION 4 (2011), available at 
http://publications.milliman.com/research/health-rr/pdfs/2011-us-organ-
tissue.pdf. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. See supra Part II.C. 
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appeals process, the inmate should be limited to care defined as Medical-
ly Necessary – Acute or Emergent or Medically Necessary – 
Nonemergent as defined by the BOP. This rule would provide care for 
“[m]edical conditions that are of an immediate, acute or emergent 
nature,”126 including emergencies such as stroke, sudden loss of vision, 
heart attack, and severe bleeding. The BOP also requires treatment of 
illnesses such as diabetes, HIV, cancer, and tuberculosis because they are 
“not immediately life-threatening but . . . without care the inmate could 
not be maintained without significant risk of serious deterioration 
leading to premature death . . . or significant pain or discomfort that 
impairs the inmate’s participation in activities of daily living.”127 Death 
row inmates are not allowed to receive joint replacements or other 
elective surgeries and are ineligible for organ transplants because the 
transplant would affect the lives of others by allowing an inmate to take 
precedence over a non-incarcerated individual.128 Maintenance of life and 
management of pain should be priorities; providing a cure should not be. 
If a diagnosis and treatment have already started prior to the com-
pletion of the appeals process, the prison would be obligated to continue 
that treatment. Failure to do so would result in a very apparent viola-
tion of Estelle. This would be a clear instance of deliberate indifference 
to a medical need because the prison officials would have known about 
the medical issue, begun treatment, and subsequently stopped treatment 
without the instruction to do so from a medical professional.  
However, the issue is different if the illness is discovered after the 
completion of the appeals process. Physicians for the non-incarcerated 
population have the ability to decide if a treatment is overly burdensome 
based on the relative benefits and burdens of the treatment to the 
patient.129 Physicians treating the prison population should be able to 
function in the same way. The commencement of cancer treatment or 
dialysis, for example, may have little benefit to the inmate, if any at all, 
before his execution, and the physician should be able to take the 
execution date into consideration when recommending treatment or 
deciding to cease treatment. Starting or continuing treatment could be 
overly burdensome to a prison system that lacks funding. Instead, the 
prison system should be allowed to focus on pain management and 
comfort instead of treatment or a cure, similar to end-of-life care. 
The appropriate cut-off for health care provided to death row in-
mates is after the inmate has exhausted the appeals process. The appeals 
 
126. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 89, at 6-7. 
127. Id. 
128. Ellis, supra note 78. 
129. See Mildred Z. Solomon et al., Decisions Near the End of Life: 
Professional Views on Life-Sustaining Treatments, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
14, 19 (1993). 
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process is in place to ensure inmates have been properly convicted130 and 
the execution process is constitutional.131 After the appeals process is 
complete, the state will most likely carry out the death sentence. It 
“shocks the conscience”132 of society that expensive procedures are 
performed on death row inmates133 who will die at the hands of the 
state.134 The money can be better spent on medications and procedures 
that affect large portions of the prison population who may eventually 
become free members of society.  
IV. Limiting Care after the Appeals Process Con-
cludes Is Constitutional 
A. Eighth Amendment Standard and the Turner Test for Prison 
Regulations 
The Eighth Amendment provides a right to be free from “cruel and 
unusual punishment”135 as determined by the “evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”136 The Eighth 
Amendment does not have the same meaning today as it did when it 
was drafted. The Estelle decision was based on an “evolving standard of 
decency” and the understanding that the standard is constantly chang-
ing. As a result, Lester Wright noted, “[A]n acceptable, expected 
standard of health care in 2007 is not the standard that was in place 
when Estelle was decided [and] it is not the standard that was in place . 
. . in 1995.”137 
Limiting care for death row inmates after the completion of the ap-
peals will satisfy Estelle’s “evolving standard of decency” standard.138 
 
130. 142 inmates have been exonerated from death row since 1973. The inmate 
must have been convicted and sentenced to death and have been pardoned 
due to evidence of innocence, retried and found not guilty, or the 
prosecution has dropped the charges to be part of this number. The 
Innocence List, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2014). 
131. See Adam Liptak, Judges Set Hurdles for Lethal Injection, N.Y TIMES 
(Apr. 12, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/12/us/12lethal.html?_r=0. 
132. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
133. See Robinson, supra note 99. 
134. Barrouquere, supra note 3.  
135. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
136. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
137. Lester N. Wright, Health Care in Prison Thirty Years after Estelle v. 
Gamble, 14 J. CORR. HEALTH CARE 31, 32 (2008). 
138. This Note focuses on serious medical needs, tailoring the discussion to 
major treatments and surgeries. 
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Public perception, societal standards, and the Supreme Court’s judgment 
are all factors in the “evolving standard of decency.” Public opinion on 
the issue of death row inmate healthcare suggests that society is hesitant 
to allow inmates healthcare that a law-abiding citizen could not acquire. 
The State of Washington state legislature attempted to pass a bill that 
would limit death row inmates’ care to “basic medical services, including 
administering medications necessary for pain relief” but would prohibit 
the use of public funds “to provide extraordinary, life-saving medical 
procedures.”139 This bill was the result of an inmate’s placement on the 
transplant list and the public outcry that followed.140 Although the bill 
ultimately failed, it suggests that there was a strong public opinion 
against the practice of allowing inmates’ access to procedures and free 
care that are not equally available to non-institutionalized citizens. The 
Supreme Court typically defers to public opinion and the legislature for 
determining the “evolving standard of decency.”  
Limiting care during the appeals process would be unconstitutional. 
During the appeals process, the death row inmate’s date of death is just 
as much of an unknown as that of an inmate serving life in prison 
without parole. Further, the appeals process is meant to ensure the 
inmate has been properly convicted. Limiting procedures before the 
appeals process concludes could be construed by a court as treating 
similarly situated inmates differently, a possible violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protections Clause.141 It would also violate the 
Turner v. Safley test to determine if the prison regulation violates the 
Eighth Amendment, as described below. 
To violate Estelle, the state must have “deliberate indifference” to a 
medical need that is serious.142 However, the best treatment option is not 
required to avoid the violation of the inmate’s Eighth Amendment 
rights.143 A disagreement between the prisoner’s expected level of care 
and the care the physician has prescribed does not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation.144 No constitutional violation results if a better 
treatment option is available, and the physician chooses the lesser 
 
139. H.R. 2889, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1996). 
140. Brandon, supra note 54. 
141. See infra Part IV.B. 
142. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
143. Id. at 107 (treating Estelle’s back pain with medication and rest did not 
violate the Eighth Amendment even if ordering x-rays on his back would 
have been a superior course of treatment). 
144. See Cramer v. Winslow, 211 F. App’x 561 (9th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that a 
disagreement between an inmate and his doctor over treatment did not 
violate the Eighth Amendment); Hall v. Tyszkiewicz, 28 Fed. Appx. 493 
(6th Cir. 2002) (holding prisoner’s disagreement with physician over course 
of treatment and medication for esophageal reflux did not amount to 
deliberate indifference). 
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option.145 Accordingly, utilization review boards have discretion over the 
appropriate course of treatment if a physician suggests more than one 
treatment regimen. The Estelle standard is satisfied as long as the 
utilization review panel is acting with sound medical judgment and is 
not disregarding a medical risk.  
Limiting the care available to death row inmates after the appeals 
process has been exhausted will not violate the inmate’s Eighth Amend-
ment rights. Death row inmates engaged in the appeals process would be 
allowed the same treatment as an inmate serving a short-term sentence, 
or even life in prison without parole, because their date of death is 
unknown and there is a possibility of release. Death row inmates would 
still be required to have access to medication. At all times, inmates 
would have access to sick call and emergency services. This Note simply 
suggests that extraordinary procedures, such as organ transplants and 
elective procedures, should not be afforded to death row inmates after 
they have completed the appeals process.  
The Supreme Court, in Turner v. Safley,146 established a test to de-
termine whether a prison regulation was reasonable. The standard for 
review is not heightened scrutiny but whether “a prison regulation that 
burdens fundamental rights is ‘reasonably related’ to legitimate 
penological objectives, or whether it represents an ‘exaggerated response’ 
to those concerns.”147 Limiting care to death row inmates who have 
appeals pending would constitute an exaggerated response to the concern 
of excessive health care costs in the prison system. Since the date of 
death is unknown for an inmate whose appeal is pending, failure to care 
for existing medical issues could result in higher medical costs later if the 
inmate is not executed. Therefore, this type of response is too exaggerat-
ed to satisfy the Turner test.  
The Turner test sets out four prongs to determine if a prison regula-
tion is reasonable and satisfies the constitutional duty the prison system 
has to the inmate. The first prong of the test states there must be “a 
‘valid rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the 
legitimate government interest put forth to justify it.”148 The second 
prong asks whether alternative means for the prisoner to exercise his 
right remain open.149 The third prong analyzes what impact the regula-
tion has on prison resources.150 Finally, the fourth prong of the test must  
145. Stewart v. Taft, 235 F. Supp. 2d 763, 771 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (holding there 
was no Eighth Amendment violation when a six month regimen for 
medication was prescribed but a nine month regimen would have been 
superior). 
146. Turner v. Safley 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
147. Id. at 87. 
148. Id. at 89. 
149. Id. at 90.  
150. Id.  
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determine if there are “ready alternatives” to the regulation.151 “If a 
claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the 
prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests,” a 
court may consider that as evidence to determine whether a prison 
regulation is invalid.152 
Limiting death row inmates’ access to extraordinary and elective 
procedures satisfies the first prong of the Turner test. The money that 
would have been used for an expensive procedure or treatment can be 
used to address other health concerns in the prison system, such as 
caring for a rapidly aging prison population153 or treating common 
illnesses effecting large portions of the prison population.154 The prison 
system’s interest in reducing the cost of health care is a valid penological 
goal.155 Security concerns are “perhaps the most legitimate of penological 
goals.”156 Death row inmates pose a higher security risk to the general 
public if they escape while they are outside the prison walls. The prison 
system has a valid interest in limiting inmate escapes.157 The use of 
additional security stretches the level of security personnel in the 
corrections facility thin, which is also a valid reason to limit the move-
ment of death row inmates outside the correctional facility.  
As for the second prong of the Turner test, death row inmates have 
alternative means to exercise their right to care. Death row inmates 
would still have access to sick call and emergency care as well as care for 
conditions that become severely debilitating. The ailments that would 
not qualify for “Medically Necessary – Acute or Emergent” or “Medically 
Necessary – Nonemergent” under the BOP guidelines can still be treated 
without being cured. Inmate’s pain can be managed and their symptoms 
can be kept at bay. Prisoners have no constitutional right to receive the 
most appropriate treatment or best care for their conditions as long as 
an acceptable standard of care is met.158 This sentiment is illustrated in 
 
151. Id.  
152. Id. at 91. 
153. Elderly inmates can cost up to twice the amount of their younger 
counterparts. At America’s Expense: The Mass Incarceration of the 
Elderly, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (June 13, 2012), 
http://www.aclu.org/criminal-law-reform/americas-expense-mass-
incarceration-elderly. 
154. See Wilper et al., supra note 19, at 668. 
155. See Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 485 (5th Cir. 2005). 
156. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003). 
157. Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 795 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that there is a 
penological interest in limiting inmate’s opportunity to escape). 
158. Treatment is “limited to that which may be provided upon a reasonable 
cost and time basis and the essential test is one of medical necessity and 
not simply that which may be considered merely desirable.” Bowring v. 
Godwin 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977).  
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the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Clark v. Hedrick.159 Clark suffered from a 
type of leukemia in which one course of treatment was an autologous 
bone marrow transplant, and the prison officials would not allow him to 
receive the transplant.160 The court found that his condition was not yet 
severe enough to warrant the transplant and that, if or when the 
condition became acute, the possibility of a transplant could then be 
assessed.161 
The third prong of the Turner test is satisfied because limiting care 
to death row inmates would have a positive effect on prison resources. 
Death row inmates pose a higher security risk when they are transported 
away from the corrections facility for medical treatment and therefore 
cost state departments of corrections more money by requiring security 
detail for transport and the duration of their treatment at an outside 
facility.162 The proposed regulation would limit a death row inmate’s 
time away from the correctional facility, which conserves security 
resources. Limiting death row inmates’ time away from the correctional 
facility also frees up security and resources for more routine prison 
health issues and reduces the number of prisoners leaving the facility. 
Restricting care to inmates who have completed the appeals process 
satisfies the fourth prong of the Turner test. The goal of restricting care 
to death row inmates involves cost saving for the corrections system, 
which is a valid penological goal.163 The restriction helps curb expenses 
by eliminating high cost procedures for death row inmates who ultimate-
ly die at the hands of the state.164 The only other feasible option to allow 
death row inmates access to these prohibited procedures while limiting 
the impact on prison resources and security would be to build and staff a 
full hospital at the prison site. While building a medical facility may 
seem like a viable cost-saving option, this option could cost taxpayers 
millions of dollars with a minimal return on investment.165 Therefore, 
 
159. Clark v. Hedrick, 233 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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5 (Sept. 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.ok.gov/doc/documents/op040114.pdf. 
163. See Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 485 (5th Cir. 2005). 
164. Barrouquere, supra note 3. Foley’s hip replacement would cost the state 
around $56,000. Id. The quality of life may be increased for a short period 
of time, but the cost is not worth the relatively small reward. Similar 
arguments are made concerning organ transplants, in that the organ 
transplant goes to waste after the inmate is executed. 
165. See California Spending Big on Healthcare While Shipping Inmates to 
Outside Hospitals, CBS SAN FRANCISCO (Nov. 5, 2012, 10:32 AM), 
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healthcare-while-shipping-inmates-to-outside-hospitals. The first prison 
hospital at San Quentin had a $136 million price tag, but prisoners were 
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there is no reasonable alternative, making the proposed restriction the 
best option for the stated goals. 
Looking at all of the Turner test prongs together, a restriction on 
death row inmate care based on whether the appeals process has been 
exhausted would not violate inmates’ Eighth Amendment right to 
receive health care. 
B. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protections Challenge 
Even though the proposed restriction on health care to death row 
inmates targets death row inmates generally and those that have 
exhausted their appeals specifically, the proposed restriction would pass 
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protections Clause.166 
The Equal Protections Clause is meant to ensure that a state’s power is 
not being used to unfairly discriminate against a specific class of individ-
uals without an important state objective.167 The court would have to 
determine whether the class of affected individuals is protected and the 
standard of review for a Fourteenth Amendment claim.  
The affected class must be reasonable – “one which includes all per-
sons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of a law.”168 
The traits of the targeted group must have a reasonable relationship to 
the “mischief” – or negative result – the restriction is attempting to 
avoid.169 In this case, the proposed restriction attempts to limit the 
“mischief” that results from providing expensive health care to an 
inmate with a short time to live. The cost to the prison health care 
system is high, while the benefit of the procedure to the prison and to 
the inmate is low. 
Under the proposed restriction, death row inmates who have ex-
hausted their appeals are the targeted class. Arguably, this grouping is 
both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. By way of example, an extreme-
ly unhealthy death row inmate who has yet to exhaust the appeals 
process costs the prison system a considerable amount of money but 
would not be subject to the proposed restriction. Therefore, the regula-
 
still sent to outside hospitals, around 5,500 times in 2011. Although, the 
State of California is building a one billion dollar facility in Stockton, it 
will not be able to perform major surgeries. Id. 
166. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”). 
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(2d ed. 2002). 
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37 CAL. L. REV. 342, 345 (1949). 
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tion is under-inclusive. At the same time, another death row inmate may 
have exhausted his appeals but have no need for a costly procedure, thus 
making the restriction over-inclusive.  
The standard of review must also be determined when analyzing a 
Fourteenth Amendment claim. The standard of review for the proposed 
restriction would not fall under strict scrutiny because death row 
inmates who have exhausted the appeals process is not a suspect class of 
individuals. Suspect classes include race,170 age,171 or national origin.172 
For a class to receive a strict scrutiny review, the court will examine 
factors such as immutable characteristics or historical discrimination of 
the class the law or regulation affects.173 Being a death row inmate is not 
an immutable characteristic nor is there historical discrimination of the 
class.  
If the class is not suspect, then the standard of review lowers to in-
termediate review or rational basis review. Intermediate scrutiny is most 
commonly used for classes related to gender.174 Intermediate scrutiny is 
inappropriate for the proposed regulation because of the incidental effect 
the proposed regulation would have on death row inmates of a particular 
gender. Death row inmates would not be treated differently because they 
are male or female but because of their status as a death row inmate. A 
greater number of male death row inmates would be affected but only 
because there are more male death row inmates than female death row 
inmates. As a result, rational basis review is appropriate, which is the 
lowest level of scrutiny the court may apply. 
Like the first prong of the Turner test, to satisfy a rational basis 
review there must be a rational relationship between the proposed 
regulation and the goal it attains.175 Conservation of prison resources is a 
valid penological goal.176 Limiting high-cost procedures conserves mone-
tary resources as well as security resources for the prison. Further, the 
same social concerns are not present with death row inmates. There is 
little worry that death row inmates will infect the non-institutionalized 
population or become a burden on the health care system because they 
will likely never be released. As a result, there is a rational relationship 
between limiting care to death row inmates and conserving prison 
resources. 
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V. Potential Problems with Limiting Health Care 
The most obvious argument against limiting care after the appeals 
process is that there is still a chance for the death row inmate to be 
removed from death row. Since 1976 there have been 273 instances of 
clemency granted for humanitarian reasons including doubts about 
defendants’ guilt or a governor’s judgment about the death penalty.177 
Many of these are a result of a moratorium on the death penalty and are 
separate from the appeals process.178 It is unclear how many of these 
grants of clemency occur after the formal appeals process has ended for a 
specific death row inmate. However, the number of humanitarian 
clemency grants is minuscule compared to the number of individuals 
sentenced to death since 1976.179 Critics may also point out that there is 
a small chance that a death row inmate may be exonerated180 at any 
time during his sentence. However, only 142 inmates have been exoner-
ated since 1973181 and most of these inmates were exonerated during 
their appeals process, thus not falling under the proposed guideline. It is 
unclear how many death row inmates have been exonerated after they 
have exhausted all appeals. Even if all exonerated inmates were included 
in the proposed guideline, the number of individuals negatively affected 
would be relatively small compared to the rest of the death row popula-
tion. 
There is also a risk that a state may abolish the death penalty. The 
most recent states to abolish the death penalty did not do so retroactive-
ly, so the inmates on death row are still considered to be death row 
inmates.182 There is a possibility that a death row inmate could be 
caught in limbo between the completion of the appeals process and an 
indefinite wait for execution, if the execution happens at all. That 
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situation would be extremely rare, and prison officials would be required 
to treat these death row inmates as inmates serving life in prison 
without parole, even though they maintain the “death row inmate” 
label, to avoid a constitutional violation. 
Critics may also point out that there is case law pertaining to in-
mate health care for an inmate who will never be released. The United 
States District Court of Delaware grappled with this conundrum in 
Derrickson v. Keve.183 Even though this decision was decided before 
Estelle, the court used the same standard as was prescribed in Estelle. 
Charles Derrickson was an inmate serving a life sentence who suffered 
from a deviated nasal septum and sinus headaches.184 The doctor 
prescribed surgery as the best option to alleviate Derrickson’s symp-
toms.185 This particular set of symptoms would cause some individuals to 
elect to have surgery to alleviate symptoms, while others would forgo 
this treatment option.186 Derrickson asserted that he would elect to 
receive the surgery if he was allowed.187 Although this type of procedure 
could be defined as elective in nature, the court held that Derrickson’s 
status as a prisoner serving a life sentence made the procedure re-
quired.188 The condition would then be made irreparable because the 
recommended treatment would be impossible due to Derrickson’s 
inability to be released to have the surgery.189 As a result, a decision that 
would never allow an inmate to have a specific surgery violates the 
Eighth Amendment, according to the court. 
Just as inmates serving life sentences without parole, death row in-
mates are generally incarcerated for the rest of their lives.190 However, 
the district court failed to consider that the inability to receive an 
elective, but medically appropriate option, is one of the freedoms 
forfeited by an inmate for committing a crime, assuming there were, in 
fact, other medically appropriate options available. Further, if the 
opinion in Derrickson is considered precedential, inmates who will spend 
the rest of their lives in prison could argue that the prison is required to 
provide any care to the inmate so long as it is one of the possible 
treatment options for their medical need and they would elect to receive 
the treatment if they were free. The district court also did not consider 
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the vastly different policy reasons for treating an inmate serving life in 
prison without parole as compared to death row inmates. Inmates 
serving life in prison have a relatively unknown date of death and will 
live out their lives in prison, whereas a death row inmate’s life will 
theoretically be cut short by the state.  
The Supreme Court has noted that “death is different . . . from any 
other punishment.”191 There is an intrinsic difference between an indi-
vidual who is allowed to serve the rest of his natural life in prison and an 
inmate who will be put to death. Those on death row have been convict-
ed of crimes so heinous that they are eligible for, and receive, a death 
sentence. It does not “shock the conscience”192 of society to limit care to 
this class of inmates, as seen by numerous opinion articles and legislative 
attempts to limit death row inmates’ access of high-cost health care.193 
Conclusion 
The Estelle standard for care does not allow an inmate to receive the 
best care or the care he wishes to receive.194 The prison health system 
should not be equivalent to a Cadillac insurance plan.195 The corrections 
system has a vested interested in containing cost while providing more 
broad, basic health care to satisfy a large portion of the prison popula-
tion’s needs. One way to limit costs would be to restrict death row 
inmate access to extraordinary or elective procedures as their execution 
date nears. This policy does not violate the Eight Amendment and 
survives the Turner test for determining if a restriction of prisoner’s 
rights is constitutional. The policy also withstands rational basis analysis 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. While this recommendation would 
not eliminate the cost of treating David Long in the ICU mere hours 
before his execution, it would limit Robert Foley from receiving a hip 
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replacement after he exhausted the appeals process. This proposal is not 
perfect but would help curb exorbitant spending on inmates who will 
likely die by the hands of the state as a result of their crimes.  
 
